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INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By William W Van
Alstyne. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1984. Pp. x, 136.
$24.75.

It is not entirely clear why so many people write about the first
amendment. Granted, the freedoms contained therein are significant
bulwarks of the American way, and, certainly, there is much to be said
in terms of legal theory and ethical philosophy about these freedoms.
Nonetheless - and this observation really applies only to the speech
and press clauses of the first amendment 1 - there appears to be a
powerful force of analytic reduction at work in most first amendment
scholarship. Everyone agrees, though often for different reasons, that
the freedoms of speech and press are good things; everyone agrees,
though often with different problems in mind, that these freedoms are
not absolutes, but can be limited by certain public interests (even
Hugo Black would have approved of laws against perjury); and everyone agrees, though often not explicitly, that at some point in the analysis a balance must be struck between the freedom in question and the
countervailing public interest.2 This analytic reduction (to a balancing
test) does leave much work to be done in the trenches. The ferreting
out of reasons why we protect the freedoms of speech and press, the
elucidation of how the exercise of these freedoms may on occasion
collide with the interests of others, and the assigning of weights to the
opposing freedoms and interests so that one side may be granted the
protection of the law and the other side left to lick its wounds, are all
socially (and academically) productive enterprises. But at a metatheoretical level ("How do we think about the first amendment?") and at
a subtheoretical level ("What's really going on when people think
about the first amendment?"), the analytic reduction appears unavoidable. The problem for the reader then becomes one of determining
what each new piece adds to the overcultivated field. Upon encountering so much that seems familiar in a first amendment essay, the reader
may wonder, "What is it that this work has to say?"
In his book Interpretationsof the FirstAmendment, Professor William W. Van Alstyne of Duke Law School has three, perhaps four,
1. The observation may also apply to some extent to the religion clauses, but because these
clauses generally pose additional, different sorts of problems, and because Professor Van Alstyne
does not discuss them, they are not included here.
2. See, eg., F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 132 (1982) ("There is
no way around the difficult task of evaluating the strength of the free speech interest, the strength
of the opposing interests, and the balance between the two."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 583 (1978) ("it is impossible to escape the task of weighing the competing considerations"); Shiffirin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory
of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1283 (1983) (arguing that general theories of
the first amendment abstract from the delicate balancing considerations that must take place).
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things to say about the freedoms of speech and press.3 First, he provides a general formulation of the free speech clause, in the manner of
a test:
The question in each case is whether the circumstances were sufficiently
compelling to justify the degree of infringement resulting from the law,
given the relationship of the speech abridged to the presuppositions of
the first amendment, and the relationship of the law to the responsibilities of the level of government that has presumed to act. [p. 48]
Second, he contends that the press should not be given a preferred first
amendment position. He suggests that "[s]hould newspapers succeed
in creating special first amendment . . . privileges that set them
uniquely apart, they may thereafter discover that they have also paved
the way for the loss of some of their own editorial freedom and for the
escalation of their legal liabilities" (p. 65). Finally, he argues against
regulating the electronic media:
[I]sn't it possible to convert airwave-frequency scarcity essentially to an
ordinary problem of mere economic scarcity, pursuant to which ... the
fact of economic scarcity per se is not a sufficient justification for requiring a private party to use his speech-property (whether a newspaper or a
broadcast station) as an unwilling carrier of other people's messages? [p.
86]
He notes, however, that "it is not obvious that the freedom of speech
would be appropriately enhanced by exclusive reliance upon a private
property system that would literally drive out all those unable to compete effectively with dollars" (p. 88).
The first chapter, "A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause,"
presents a series of arguments accompanied by a series of graphic depictions of what the first amendment might and might not protect.
"Might and might not" rather than "ought and ought not" is descriptive of Van Alstyne's rather carefully non-normative method of presentation. Even when he states his general formulation of the free
speech clause (quoted above), Van Alstyne is merely recounting how
the Court has behaved. His descriptive conclusion - there are certain
categories of speech (e.g., criminal solicitation, perjury) that never receive first amendment protection ("definitional balancing"), and there
are certain instances of otherwise protected speech that sometimes lose
first amendment protection (e.g., clear, present, and serious danger;
"ad hoc balancing") - is indeed nothing new. His task here appears
3. The book is comprised of an introduction called "Interpreting This Constitution," which
essentially argues against noninterpretivist theories of judicial review, and three chapters. Chapter 1 is an adaptation of an article previously appearing in 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982) as A

GraphicReview of the FreeSpeech Clause. Chapter 2 is not an adaptation from a previous article,
but is derived from some related works that appeared in 9 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1980) as The
FirstAmendment and the Free Press: New Trends and Old Theories, and in 28 HASTINGs L.J.
761 (1977) as The Hazardsto the Press of Claiming a "Preferred" Position. Chapter 3 originally
appeared in different form in 29 S.C. L. REV. 539 (1978) as The M"bius Strip ofthe FirstAmendment: Perspectives on Red Lion.
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to be one of synthesis and restatement, not one of "original" affirmative argument. As such, the first chapter is a cogent review of the free
speech clause.
The second chapter, "The Controverted Uses of the Press Clause,"
presents the arguments for and against a preferred first amendment
position for the press. Agency theory is central here; the argument in
favor of a preferred position is that the press acts as the public's agent,
as the "fourth estate," against the government. But Van Alstyne finds
two arguments against a preferred position more persuasive. First, the
preferred position's factual predicate is false - the press acts often out
of a profit motive and not from a sense of fiduciary duty. Second, and
significantly, if the press wants to be treated specially because it acts as
the public's agent, then the press must also bear the heavy accountability of a fiduciary, thereby losing editorial autonomy and gaining
legal liability.
But Van Alstyne fails to consider that what's special about the
press may be a constitutional grant of rights without duties, that is,
that the first amendment's separate phrase "or of the press" was meant
to secure to the press a broader scope of legal protection, both as a
sword (e.g., access rights) and as a shield (e.g., libel defense), and that
the only way to secure such protection is by not burdening the press
with a commensurate set of duties to match its rights. The press may,
in the end, serve a stronger public agency function by being permitted
to roam free.
In his third and most provocative chapter, "Scarcity, Property,
and Government Policy: The First Amendment as a M6bius Strip,"
Van Alstyne details the arguments for and against treating electronic
media differently from print media. The basic argument in favor of
different treatment is the familiar one of spectrum scarcity and public
trust: There is more demand for broadcast frequencies than there are
frequencies, the government "owns" the airwaves, and therefore with
the rights of a license come the duties of regulation. Van Alstyne
neatly sidesteps the problem of unconstitutional conditions, that is, the
argument that the government can't impede constitutional rights
(here, freedom of the press) by granting a privilege (here, a broadcast
license) conditioned on the relinquishment of those rights (here, by the
imposition of the various Federal Communications Act regulations 4).
In a footnote, Van Alstyne points out that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not invalidate all conditions on governmental
privileges; rather,
it imposes upon government the burden to demonstrate a constitution4. These regulations include the duty to devote broadcast time to relevant public issues, the
duty to provide equal time to the opposition when a partisan perspective on a controversial
public issue is broadcast, and the duty to permit local programming during a portion of prime
time. The Federal Communications Act appears at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982) (originally enacted as the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064).
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ally significant difference sufficient to account for a condition (namely,
the duty to carry other people's messages) distinguishably relevant to
this context. Here, of course, the "distinguishably relevant" fact is the
exclusivity of use-rights granted the successful applicant, and the justification of mitigating the excluded use-rights of others [who were denied,
or lack, a license]. [p. 123 n.65]
But, as in Chapter Two, both a factual and a theoretical flaw exist
in the argument supporting different treatment (here, of electronic media from print media; there, of the press from other free speech
agents), and Van Alstyne finds these flaws irreparable. The factual
problem is that as a result of technological developments there may
not actually be more demand for broadcast frequencies than there are
frequencies. The theoretical problem is that, even with spectrum scarcity, the government could allocate broadcast frequencies as it does
real property - by selling on the open market. For the reader who is
concerned about wealth distribution problems in this free market scenario, Van Alstyne adds a few pages of distressed acknowledgment
that people without money will, indeed, have trouble competing under
this new, deregulated regime. He admits that some airwave use might
be best set aside from the open market auction.
Van Alstyne frames this last chapter with the image of a M6bius
strip, defined as "Topology, a one-sided surface that can be formed
from a rectangular strip by rotating one end 180* and attaching it to
the other end" (p. 68). Van Alstyne quotes approvingly from a student's paper: "Deriving a consistent theory of the First Amendment
from the myriad opinions of the Supreme Court represents a task similar to the problem of defining the inside and outside of a M6bius strip;
that which appears logical at one point evaporates from another perspective" (p. 68). First amendment jurisprudence is, on this view, paradoxical, endorsing at various moments seemingly contradictory
values.
Regarding electronic media, Van Alstyne's point is that the first
amendment can be invoked to argue both for and against regulation.
But surely this is not news; Rawls, for example, made quite clear that
one's ability to speak - which is influenced by one's wealth - affects
the value of the otherwise abstract "freedom of speech."'5 Furthermore, that the derivation of a consistent first amendment theory leads
to a paradox because neoclassical and Keynesian economics can both
be invoked in defense of a reasonable interpretation of the amendment
does not appear to distinguish the problematic nature of first amendment theory from that of other constitutional provisions, or from
other areas of law. Wealth is often necessary for the exercise of freedom; regulation of one person's freedom is often necessary for another's to flourish. This is so with speech and press - and beyond.
5. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221-28 (1971).
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Perhaps Van Alstyne would agree. But Interpretationsof the First
Amendment remains a work limited by its place within the analytic
reduction of free speech and free press scholarship. At a metatheoretical level, there is nothing very paradoxical going on at all, merely an
acknowledgment (albeit often tacit) that interests must be balanced.
One wishes that the image of the elusive M6bius strip would appear at
this level; as it is, the topology is rather flat.
-Abner

S. Greene

